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Some physicians and hospital 
administrators view the law as 
obstructing medical progress and 
destroying the doctor-patient re-
lationship. l This perception is 
fostered by civil medical malprac-
tice litigation which is viewed by 
many as unfair. 2 Less frequently 
a significant criminal case against 
a physician, such as the 1975 Bos-
ton case in which a physician was 
tried for manslaughter for failing 
to attempt to preserve the " life" 
of a fetus during a legal abortion, 
will arouse both resentment and 
fear in the medical community . .1 
These attitudes toward the law 
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and lawyers are both unfortunate 
and unnecessary. The legal sys-
tem is nothing more (or less) 
than a system for resolving con-
flicts and making difficult deci-
sions, and the major aim of legal 
counseling is usually preventive. 
It is to predict major problems 
that might arise from a given 
course of action, and suggest ways 
that such problems might be ei-
ther avoided or lessened. 
In an area as complex as inten-
sive care for the critically ill, the 
prudent physician and hospital 
administrator will seek legal ad-
vice before introducing novel ap-
proaches to decision-making con-
cerning treatment or termination 
of treatment. While the law can-
not, and should not presume to, 
answer the question of what doe~: 
or does not constitute proper 
medical care in the ICU, the law 
can be extremely helpful to thp 
physician by identifying those as-
pects of the decision-making pro-
cess that affect the patient's legal 
rights. 
The "patient rights movement" 
in this country, if one can be said 
to truly exist, is of relatively re-
cent origin and exists as an off-
shoot of the consumer movement 
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in our society. The movement is 
founded on two fundamental 
propositions: (1) the American 
medical consumer possesses cer-
tain interests , many of which may 
be properly described as legal 
rights, that he does not auto-
matically forfeit by entering into 
a relationship with a physician or 
health care facility ; and (2) most 
physicians and health care facili-
ties fail to recognize the existence 
of these rights and interests, fail 
to provide for their protection or 
assertion , and frequently limit 
their exercise without recourse for 
the patient.4 . ,i 
Because a sick person's first 
concern is to regain his health , 
he is usually willing to give up 
rights that otherwise would be 
vigorously asserted. The sicker a 
person is, the more willing he is 
to permit others unlimited con-
trol over his body. The intensive 
care unit may be the place in the 
hospital where the patient is most 
easily denied any participation in 
decision-making about his future. 
Because the dangers of loss of 
autonomy and privacy are great-
est in this setting, the obligations 
of the physician and staff of the 
unit to preserve the patient's le-
gal and human rights are perhaps 
more compelling than in any oth-
er hospital setting. 
From the patient's perspective, 
his first wish is usually either to 
recover, or, if that is impossible, 
to continue to live with the least 
pain, disfigurement and disability 
possible. The price of continued 
life, in terms of economics, pain, 
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disability, probability of recovery, 
or any other criteria relevant to 
the patient, may, however, be too 
high for an individual. In such 
cases discontinuance of active 
treatment may be sought by the 
patient or his family. It is my 
view that the wishes of the men-
tally competent ad u I t patient 
should always be honored by the 
hospital staff, provided that he 
has discussed the implications of 
his wi she s with his physician. 
If a classification system, such 
as 0 n e discussed elsewhere in 
this issue (in which patients are 
g r 0 u p e d into four categories, 
each of which calls for degrees of 
medical e f for t ranging from 
"maximal" to "discontinuance of 
all life support assistance and 
therapy") , serves both to enhance 
the patient's role in decision-
making about his treatment, and 
improve or at least not downgrade 
the quality of ffio.3dical care he re-
ceives, then i ~8 ;lltroduction is a 
step in the right direction. If, on 
the other hand, such a system 
deprives the patient of what litle 
voice he now has in medical de-
cision-making, its introduction 
should be strenuously opposed. 
Without having directly par-
ticipated in the types of decisions 
necessitated by a "triage" classi-
fication scheme in the intensive 
care unit, my initial judgment is 
that such a scheme contains both 
the potential for great good and 
the potential for great abuse. 
Rather than minutely dissecting 
all the potential legal issues 
raised by such a system, I will 
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deal with the four which strike 
me as the most important in im-
plementing such a system of pa-
tient care classification in an 
intensive care unit: proper au-
thority, proper documentation , 
adequate prediction criteria, and 
adequate representation of the 
patient's desires and interests in 
the decision-making process. 
Proper Authority 
A number of court cases during 
the past decade have enunciated 
a doctrine of corporate liability 
in the hospital field. This doc-
trine is essentially that the hos-
pital may be held liable in a 
malpractice suit for the actions 
not only of its employees but also 
of the physicians it permits to 
practice me d i c i n e within its 
walls.6 The basis of this finding is 
that the board of directors of the 
hospital has both the authority 
and the duty to supervise medical 
practice wit h i n the hospital. 
Therefore if a patient is injured 
because an unqualified or con-
sistently careless physician is per-
mitted to treat him, both the 
physician and the hospital are 
responsible to the patient. In one 
notorious case a hospital failed to 
revoke a physician's staff privi-
leges even though it could have 
discovered, had it performed a 
proper review of patient records, 
that the physician was perform-
ing unnecessary laminectomies 
that were resulting in permanent 
disabilities to a number of his 
patients.7 
Because the ultimate legal re-
sponsibility rests with the board 
of directors of the hospital, it is 
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essential that this body formally 
approve any systematic deviance 
from what would otherwise be 
"standard" medical treatment. 
Because medical expertise rests 
with the medical staff, approval 
of the executive board of the 
medical staff should also be re-
quired. Since the success of any 
such system demands complete 
cooperation and concurrence of 
t hose in charge of the ICU, the 
approval of those in charge of this 
unit should also be sought. In 
providing for these formal ap-
provals, the Tagge proposal is to 
be commended. Even with these 
"policy" approvals, however, it 
might be appropriate for the pro-
tocol to be reviewed and approved 
by the hospital's human studies 
committee. 
Proper Documentation 
The importance of good data 
keeping in any study is elemen-
tary. If good data is not kept the 
ethics of conducting the study 
are immediately called into ques-
tion, and the pro b a b il i t Y of 
attaining significant and convinc-
ing results is diminished. These 
observations apply to the ICU 
classification scheme. 
Legally, there is no excuse for 
not entering important treatment 
decisions and orders in the pa-
tient's permanent record. The 
AMA unequivocally recommends 
that an order not to provide car-
diopulmonary resuscitation be 
entered directly in the patient's 
progress notes and also indicated 
"on the physician's order sheet 
for the benefit of nurses and oth-
er personnel who may be called 
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upon to initiate 01' participate in 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation."~ 
In striking contrast, the policy on 
classification at the Massachu-
setts General Hospital is that 
"such orders as 'Do Not Resusci-
tate (DNR)', etc., should be 
communicated directly verbally 
to the nursing and house staff, 
and should be registered in the 
nursing notes, but not written 
into the regular order sheet or per-
manent record." (emphasis sup-
plied) 9 At this particular hospital 
such nursing notes are routinely 
destroyed following the patient's 
death or discharge (a procedure 
permitted under Massachusetts 
law) so that the only purpose of 
such a policy seems to be to de-
stroy any evidence that the doc-
tor ever gave such an order or 
that the hospital would ever ap-
prove such an order. As a policy, 
this covert method of medical 
practice may be coun terproduc-
tive (i.e., some nurses or house 
staff members may not learn of 
the verbal order and so attempt 
resuscitation). Moreover, it in-
dicates that those implementing 
the classifica tion system do not 
really believe that what they are 
doing is right or legal, or that 
they have been given the propel' 
authority to do it. Such a policy 
thus calls the entire classification 
method into serious question. Nor 
is it an effective way to avoid any 
legal consequences that might be 
feared, since the nursing and 
house staff can be compelled to 
appear as witnesses in both civil 
and criminal cases, and can testi-
fy to the verbal order. Also, if 
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the system is functioning proper-
ly, the order will not be kept 
secret from the surviving family, 
since they should have had (with 
the competent patient's consent) 
a part in making this decision 
themselves! 
Adequate Prediction Criteria 
The law is very skeptical about 
man's ability to predict death. In 
one recent case involving estate 
taxes, for example, the tax tables 
had put a 75 year-old woman's 
life expectancy at 6 years. The 
IRS attempted, with medical tes-
timony, to prove that her "ac-
tual" life expectancy was less 
than a year since she was suffer-
ing from cancel' of the colon which 
had metastasized to the liver, a 
disease all agreed was both fatal 
and incurable. A number of physi-
cians testified at the trial con-
cerning the woman's actual life 
expectancy. One cancer expert 
said "I do not believe you can 
place a time span on her expected 
length of life ... [IJ had at least 
one case who has lived six years 
now with liver metastasis." 
Another cancer expert, this one 
called by the IRS, testified that 
the deceased "could have lived 
for a year," but added "in medi-
cine you can't be too didactic, 
beql.Use someone always surpris~s 
you." A third physician, an in-
ternist, put her life expectancy 
at one to six months. The court 
found that on the basis of this 
testimony the range of predict-
able life was between one month 
and at least six years (absent 
clinical signs of imminent death), 
and that determination of actual 
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life expectancy, even by experts, 
would be " little better than a 
guess." IU 
Not only are courts unlikely to 
accept non-unanimous me d i cal 
views of imminent death, they are 
also likely to place a high value 
on even very slim chances of sur-
vival. Courts have required ship 
owners to make rea son a b 1 e 
searches for persons who have 
fallen overboard, eve n where 
chances of recovery are negligible. 
In one case a seaman was not 
discovered missing until five and 
one half hours after he had last 
been seen. The captain refused to 
reverse course and search, argu-
ing that there was almost no 
chance he was still alive. The 
court found against the captain 
saying "Once the evidence sus-
tains a reasonable possibility of 
rescue, ample or narrow, accord-
ing to the circumstances, total 
disregard of the duty, refusal to 
make even a try, as was the case 
here, imposes liability."11 As one 
commentator approvingly noted, 
"it is ancient learning that 'a 
drowning man cannot pull himself 
out by his own hair,' and a 2% 
chance of rescue as opposed to a 
98 % chance of survival is pro-
portionately t hat much more 
precious." 12 
A recent New York malprac-
tice case approved a similar find-
ing by a jury against a physician 
and a hospital. The physician had 
ordered a drug, Naturetin, which 
was necessary to reduce the pa-
tient's blood pressure so that she 
could undergo surgery. For some 
reason the drug was not admin-
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istered, the operation could not 
be performed, and the patient 
died. There was testimony that, 
even without the surgery, the ad-
ministration of the drug as pre-
scribed would have given the 
woman a 2% chance of survival. 
The jury specifically did not find 
negligence in the failure to per-
form the surgery, but based its 
award of $70,000 solely on the 
negligent denial of a 2% chance 
of survival. u 
The lesson of these cases is 
clear. No decision should be made 
to terminate treatment of a pa-
tient without the patient's com-
petent, understanding and vol-
untary consent unless there is no 
chance of survival. If there is any 
measureable chance of survival, 
even as little as one or two per-
cent, the legal duty of the staff of 
the intensive care unit would 
seem to be to exercise alI" of their 
skills to give their patient the full 
benefit of that chance. Reversing 
nature's processes and saving the 
previously unsaveable is, after all, 
what intensive care treatment is 
all about. By operating such a 
unit the hospital takes upon it-
self a higher duty of medical care 
for the critically ill than it would 
have without such a unit. 
Adequate Patient Representation 
In life and death decision-
making about individual patients 
it is essential that the patient's 
interests be adequately represent-
ed. It should be readily apparent 
that no patient in an ICU can 
properly represent his own posi-
tion - either for vigorous con-
tinued treatment or for cessation 
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of treatment. Nor are members 
of his immediate family usually 
in a position to knowledgeably 
and effectively champion the 
rights and desires of the critically 
ill patient. 
In a court proceeding, where 
decisions will be made about a 
person who is unable to represent 
his own interests (e.g., for rea-
sons of age, mental incompeten-
cY), the court will appoint a 
"guardian. " The guardian's job 
is to represent the interests of the 
minor or incompetent in the legal 
proceedings. I suggest that any 
time categorization decisions are 
going to be made in staff rounds 
or recommended by an advisory 
group, the patient be represented 
in all such deliberations by a per-
son whom I term a "patient rights 
advocate."!· The advocate's duty 
is to make those arguments that 
the patient would were he physi-
cally or mentally able to repre-
sent his own interests. The 
advocate should be named by the 
patient, but could also be a mem-
ber of the advisory group spe-
cifically designated for such a 
role. The advocate's only loyalty, 
however, must be to the patient 
and the advocate's only duty 
must be to represent the patient's 
interests as best he or she carl. As 
an example, the advocate should 
ensure that decisions are only 
based on relevant criteria , and 
never on such considerations as 
race or ability to pay. 
In the event that the patient is 
comatose and has not indicated 
a prior wish against heroics (e.g., 
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through a living will) the advu-
cate should be required to assume 
that the patient wants all rea-
sonable medical steps taken to 
preserve his life, and argue for the 
position accordingly . Only with 
such strong presentation of the 
arguments in favor of continuing 
treatment can the treating physi-
cian, the ICU staff, or the ad-
visory committee to the ICU, 
have any confidence that they 
have considered all the reasonable 
arguments in favor of the pa-
tient's desires. If treatment is 
terminated without providing the 
patient with the benefit of such 
an advocate, the patient effective-
ly loses any independent voice in 
the decision-making process about 
his future. The entire proposed 
classification scheme then be-
comes little better than if deci-
sions were left to the individual 
attending physician. 
Summary 
The law and legal analysis of 
decision-making processes can 
playa positive role in promoting 
patient rights without retarding 
potential medical advances. To 
achieve both of these goals any 
system of patient classification 
that determines treatment or non-
treatment in an Intensive Care 
Unit should make provisions for 
proper authority, proper docu-
mentation, adequate prediction 
criteria, and adequate patient 
representation. If any of these 
elements is missing, the rights of 
critically ill patients may be com-
promised rather than enhanced. 
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The Human Life Center 
In his Divine Comedy, Dante spoke 
of neutrals as "people who never were 
alive." It was Socrates who said that 
"the unexamined life is not worth liv-
ing." Today we are witnessing a bar-
rage of attacks on human life itself, be 
they through abortion-euthanasia , in-
creasing suicide, disregard for the aged 
and unborn, subtle forms of discrimi-
nation, elimination of the poor and 
"unfit," mandatory sterilization, Play-
boy-Playgirl sexual hedonism with its 
accompanying VD, and a host of other 
anti-life evils. Meanwhile, in Viktor 
Frankl's words, " Man is born to ask 
why he was born." 
The Human Life Center aims to 
explore and clarify all dimensions of 
the human life issue - through re-
search, workshops, life-long, learning 
programs, consultations, dialogues, etc. 
- at Minnesota's peaceful, quiet St. 
John's University and in all parts of 
the country, 
Among subjects to be considered: 
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Abortion-euthanasia; preparation for 
marriage; marriage enrichment; care 
of the aged and other segments of so-
ciety; education and counseling in hu-
man sexuality and love; natural family 
planning; parent effectiveness training; 
death and dying. The resuscitation, re-
search, defense, cultitvation, and pro-
motion of vanishing Judeo-Christian 
and human values will receive prime 
attention and the widest propagation 
from the spiritual , intellectual, liturgi -
cal, and cultural center that is Minne-
sota's St. John's Abbey and University. 
Programs are being developed now 
for June 8-20; June 12-15; June 20-22 ; 
and June 29-July 2. Additional in-
formation on these programs and on 
registration procedures are available 
from: 
Paul Marx, O.S.B., Director 
The Human Life Center 
Saint John's University 
Collegeville, Minnesota 56321 
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